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holders specifying a tax level and a transfer from the latter to the
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In some countries endowed with exhaustible resources, powerful rich resource
holders coexist with a large population of poor people. Some of these coun-
tries are given foreign aid from the developed world, while the latter, through
distortional resource taxation, captures part of the mining rent of the resource
holders. Is there a more e￿cient way to help the poor living in resource-rich
countries? One solution that was suggested in a 1986 study by the Con-
gressional Budget O￿ce of the United States was to lower the tari￿ on oil
imported from poor countries 1. However, there is no guarantee that the re-
sulting extra rent would have been fairly shared with the poor population.
Recently, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) propose the drastic option
of equally sharing the entire resource revenues with the whole population.
Although very appealing, this solution is unlikely to be implementable from
a political economy point of view. Our paper aims at designing an e￿cient
and feasible redistribution scheme: a contract with the resource holders on
the tax rate and on the share of the resource rent to be redistributed to the
poor.
Oil endowments are concentrated in some geologically speci￿c grounds.
As a consequence, their distribution across countries is very heterogeneous.
For instance, the 19 countries with the largest crude oil reserves per capita
represent more than 80% of the current world reserves 2. In a world where
countries decide individually on their taxation policy, this heterogeneity pro-
vides resource producing countries and resource consuming countries with
di￿erent incentives to tax the resource. The reason for this is that the taxa-
tion of exhaustible resources entails a rent transfer from resource producers
to the ￿scal authorities (see Bergstrom, 1982, and Daubanes and Grimaud,
2006, for theoretical analysis). Of course, resource taxation can have other
rationales. In particular, it may be an economic instrument to correct the
pollution externality due to carbon emissions resulting from the resource
combustion. Even in that case, a resource-poor country will have a propen-
sity to overtax the resource relatively to a resource-rich country 3. Indeed,
a simple empirical study (Bacon, 2001) states that taxes in oil producing
countries are lower than those in the non-producing regions. This introduces
a bias at the global level: resource taxes are much higher in top-consuming
1The objective of this proposal was actually to avoid Mexico’s disability to meet its
debt payments.
2Sources: The World Bank and Oil & Gas Journal.
3Moreover, it seems that world leaders in the debate on mitigating pollution emissions
have chosen "cap and trade" instruments based on permits market. In this context,
resource taxation would be useless to regulate pollution.
1regions. There are two reasons why this bias may not be desirable.
On the one hand, this results in very di￿erent ￿nal resource prices across
countries4. The resulting di￿erences in marginal resource productivities cause
economic ine￿ciencies at the world level (see Daubanes and Grimaud, 2006).
In other words, the bias in resource taxation due to heterogeneous endow-
ments and non-cooperative local policy design is distortional.
On the other hand, high taxes in developed, top-consuming, regions, lead
to huge rent transfers5 from some poor countries to the developed world.
Indeed, most of the resource exporting countries are low or middle income
countries. For instance, the per capita GNI over the 19 countries with the
largest crude oil reserves per capita is lower than US$58006. In particular,
among the top oil-producers, some countries are very poor in per capita
terms. Typically, in these countries, resource holders receiving the net rent,
coexist with numerous very poor workers to which the developed world gives
foreign aid7.
Overall, rich developed, top fuel consuming countries capture rents, through
distortional resource taxation, supposed to accrue to these poor resource-rich
countries, while, at the same time, they transfer aid to these countries. Of
course, these inter-country transfers don’t involve the same categories of res-
idents. Aid is supposed to be transferred to poor workers while rents are
extracted from rich resource holders’ revenues. The situation of the di￿erent
groups under the coexistence of these opposite transfers between resource
consumers and resource producers and under the related distortional taxes,
can be improved. We show that the use of an original redistributive instru-
ment can help mitigate the associated distortions and make all concerned
4The IEA (2001) remarks the extent of this heterogeneity as regards fuels taxation and
notes that recent ￿scal measures don’t lead to a convergence of these tax rates.
5Given the current high prices of fossil fuels and the high tax rates in most of the top-
consuming countries (see IEA, 2001), these rent transfers are indeed supposed to represent
huge amounts. A recent document by the OPEC states that over the period 2000-2004,
the G7 nations made a total of US$1,600 billion from oil taxation. Another document by
the IEA (2001) reports that, in OECD, oil product taxes represent, on average, slightly
less than 6% of total tax revenues (6.5% for the EU15).
6Sources: The World Bank and Oil & Gas Journal.
7One of the most suited examples of the countries we refer to is Nigeria. In 2005, fuel
exports amounted to 98% of nigerian merchandize exports. In PPP terms, Nigeria’s per
capita GDP was US$1,113 in 1970 and US$1,084 in 2000. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
(2003) shows how the income distribution deteriorated very sharply since the discovery
of oil in Nigeria: "more and more people have been pushed towards poverty and towards
extreme wealth". In this country, 70% of the population lived on less than US$1 per day
in 2000. In 2005, foreign aid given to Nigeria was equal to about 8% of its GNI and its
value was of US$6,437,309,952. Similar examples could be provided by reference to Iran
and Algeria. Sources: The World Bank, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003).
2groups better-o￿.
The issue of redistributing wealth to poor countries endowed with natu-
ral resources is related to three di￿erent economics literatures. First, for the
last decades, the environmental economics literature has developed general
equilibrium models of resource depletion. In particular, the standard inte-
grated models representing a homogeneous world have been disaggregated to
study the inter-country transfers due to resource taxation. Bergstrom (1982)
shows how resource taxation entails rent transfers from resource producing
countries to resource consuming countries. The argument is based on the
exhaustibility of the resource, that bounds its asymptotic cumulated sup-
ply. In Brander and Djajic (1983), both the consuming and the producing
countries are represented by local social planners. The consuming country is
then limited in extracting the resource rent by the threat of the producing
country to use the resource itself. Daubanes and Grimaud (2006) uses a re-
lated framework where decisions are decentralized and the resource use ￿lls
a stock of atmospheric pollution. It emphasizes that the consuming coun-
try is limited by the loss of competitiveness, and the subsequent relocation
of the productive activities, resulting from a higher tax rate. It also shows
that, even when the taxation of the resource aims at correcting the pollution
externality, the bias in the resource-poor economy that consists in taxing at
a higher rate than optimally remains. With respect to these contributions,
the present paper considers intra-country heterogeneity and a form of inter-
country altruism. We consider a two-class resource-rich economy (South)
where the poor (southern poor) coexist with rich resource holders (south-
ern rich), who control the government, and a rich resource-poor economy
(North), whose agents are altruistic towards the southern poor. We also
introduce aid mechanisms.
Second, the development economics literature has examined the particu-
lar di￿culties of developing countries with abundant natural resources. Some
papers try to ￿gure out why these economies grow more slowly than those
without natural resources, which is the well known phenomenon of the re-
source curse. One of the most frequent explanations of this stylized fact is
related to the so-called Dutch disease: the fact that important amounts of
foreign exchange entering the country lead to the appreciation of the local
currency and undermine the competitiveness of other exporting sectors, like
manufacturing or agriculture. Other explanations are related to the volatil-
ity of the government’s revenues caused by the volatility of the international
resource prices, which often leads to in￿ation and hurts growth. Other pa-
pers try to understand why resource-rich economies have poorer institutions
than the others. One of the explanations of this phenomenon is the fact that
the resource revenues remove the need to collect taxes, thus undermining the
3accountability of the government. Moreover, important resource revenues
encourage rent-seeking behavior. A ￿nal stylized fact about these countries
is the high income inequality in the population. The fact that "point source"
natural resources like oil are more easily controlled by an elite and do not
need widespread labor explains why the resource revenues are usually not
shared with the population but are concentrated in the hands of a small
elite. For a comprehensive description of the resource curse phenomenon in
developing countries, see Collier (2007). The question we are interested in
is how donor countries can help the population which does not bene￿t from
the resource revenues. A direct solution that comes to one’s mind is foreign
aid.
The di￿erent aspects of foreign aid have been very extensively studied in
the development economics literature during the last decades. In particular,
the e￿ects of aid on growth, on the policy reforms and on the institutions
of the recipient countries, the reasons why foreign aid is given (political and
economic), the behavior of donor institutions, the fact that foreign aid is
fungible and a large part of it does not reach its intended purpose, are some
of the issues that have been hotly debated these last couple of years. For a
good survey of the aid literature, see Kanbur (2006). In the present paper,
the only objective of foreign aid is to increase the consumption of the poor
living in the resource-rich countries. But, additionally to standard foreign
aid, we introduce an original redistribution instrument: a contract with the
elite that controls the resource rents. By signing this contract, the North
commits to lower the tax on the resource imports, thus leaving a larger part
of the resource rent to the southern elite, but in exchange the latter commits
to redistribute some of this new rent to the poor. We will show that this
additional instrument not only increases the welfare of the North, but also
that of the southern rich and that of the southern poor.
Finally, the international economics literature has studied the welfare
e￿ects of international transfers, a pioneer paper in this ￿eld being that of
Samuelson (1954). The main focus of this literature has been the e￿ects
of a transfer on the terms of trade and its net e￿ects on the welfare of the
donor, of the recipient and eventually of a third party not participating in
the transaction. In general this literature assumes no inter-country altruism.
For example, Lahiri et al (2002) shows that aid can improve the welfare of
both the donor and the recipient because it can lead to a reduction in the
recipient’s optimal trade taxes and thus to an increase in global e￿ciency.
In our paper, the e￿ciency and welfare improving e￿ects of aid and those of
the contract with the South are also related to the indirect e￿ects of these
redistribution instruments on the choice of the tari￿. But contrarily to this
literature, there are no terms of trade e￿ects in our paper as we suppose a
4single ￿nal good and a single mobile input. The only tari￿ we consider is the
tax on the imports of the resource by the donor (the North), and it is the
decrease in this tax that improves global e￿ciency and welfare when foreign
aid and the contract are simultaneously used.
In the two-country, three-group context described above, we use a decen-
tralized general equilibrium model of resource depletion, in order to examine
how the North will choose the resource tax under di￿erent redistribution
options. The equilibrium consumption levels of all groups are realized de-
pending on the prior choice of the instruments by the North government.
First, we consider a benchmark case without any redistribution mechanisms.
The bias in the behavior of the North consists in taxing the resource at a
rate greater than optimal. When the North can give foreign aid, it taxes the
resource at a lower rate, still higher than the optimal one. When the North
can use both foreign aid and the contract, it no longer taxes the resource,
thus correcting the global distortion due to strategic taxation policy design
and endowments heterogeneity.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the
institutions and the redistribution mechanisms. In section 3, we compute the
general equilibrium outcome for a given taxation policy and given amounts
of foreign aid and internal aid. Section 4 examines the choice of the northern
government under three redistribution alternatives. The main results are
presented in this section. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Technology
At each date t ∈ [0,+∞), the ￿nal output is produced in both countries using




α, i = N,S, (2.1)
where Li is the quantity of labor employed in the production sector, Ri is
the quantity of natural resource used in country i. The subscripts N and S
refer respectively to North and South.
Ai, i = N,S, is an index of labor productivity in each country. Technical
improvement is given exogenously. For simplicity, these two indexes are
8For simplicity, the time argument of each variable is dropped as long as this does not
create ambiguity.
5supposed to be proportional, thus growing at the same rate 9:
AN = A, AS = φA, 1 ≥ φ > 0, gA = x > 0, A(0) = A0 given, (2.2)
where φ can be interpreted as a degree of southern development.
The total quantities of labor in the North and the South respectively, LN
and LS, are locally ￿xed and constant over time.
The resource is freely extracted from a ￿nite initial stock and can be used
in both countries:
˙ Q = −R = −(RN + RS), Q(0) = Q0 > 0, given. (2.3)
2.2 Agents, Preferences and Endowments
In the South, there are two homogeneous groups: a group of poor in￿nitely-
lived workers and a group of rich in￿nitely-lived resource holders.
Each southern worker is endowed with a unit of labor. The size of this
group is LS. We refer to this group by SP to mean "southern poor"10. Their






where CSP is the total consumption of the southern poor people and ρ is the
discount rate common to all groups.
The group of southern resource holders is endowed with the entire stock
of the resource Q. The size of this group is normalized to unity and their






where CSR is the total consumption of this group.
In the North, there is a homogeneous group of households. Each of them
are workers endowed with one unit of labor. The size of this group is LN.
They are altruistic in the sense that their utility depends positively on the
9For any variable X, its derivative with respect to time t is denoted by ˙ X and its
growth rate over time by gX =
˙ X
X.
10For notational convenience, we choose to denote the size of the southern poor popu-
lation by LS instead of LSP.









where CN is the total consumption of this group and δ is the rate of altruism
of northern households.
Finally, the binding world budget constraint is as follows:
CN + CSR + CSP = YN + YS. (2.7)
2.3 Markets and other Institutions
There is a world competitive market for the extracted resource 12, R, and the
￿nal good, Y . The price of the latter is normalized to unity and the price of
the resource is denoted by p. There is a world ￿nancial market on which the
interest rate is denoted by r. There are two local competitive labor markets.
The respective wages are denoted by wN and wS.
The northern households (N) are represented by a northern government.
The latter maximizes the utility of the representative northern household
using several instruments. First, this government can apply a multiplicative
tax rate τ > 0 on the use of the natural resource, so that pτ is the consumer
price paid by the ￿rms in the North and p is the producer price received
by the resource producers in the South 13. The tax revenue is redistributed
to the northern households. The tax rate chosen by the North is restricted
to be constant over time14. Second, the North government can transfer an
11Actually, these authors assume that the southern rich put a positive weight on the
consumption of the southern poor, but this weight is lower than that of the North. For
simplicity we focus on the extreme case where this weight is zero (equation (2.4)) but the
intuitions of our results would remain true as long as the altruism of the southern rich
towards the poor is lower than that of the northern citizens.
12The results are robust to the introduction of market-power in the extraction sector.
Indeed, market-power is hardly exercised in the extraction of an explicitly non-renewable
resource since the asymptotic cumulative quantity is set exogenously. On this, see Stiglitz
(1976).
13In fact, this amounts to setting an ad valorem tax rate τ − 1 > −1. Hence, a multi-
plicative tax rate τ > 1 is equivalent to a strictly positive ad valorem tax rate τ − 1 > 0.
14This assumption is made for simplicity. One could show, allowing the tax rate to
be time-dependent, that the North government will always set it constant. The main
reason why it is so is that the rate at which the resource is used in the North is optimal
(gRN = −ρ). In this context, a time varying tax rate will distort it. In the presence of
an environmental distortion, due for instance to the polluting nature of the resource, the
chosen tax rate may not be constant. See Daubanes and Grimaud (2006) for reference to
such a framework. However, the introduction of pollution will complicate the analysis a
good deal, while not a￿ecting our main results.
7amount F(t) of ￿nal good, at each date t, from the northern citizens to
the southern poor people. This instrument is standard foreign aid. Finally,
the North government can contract with the South government on the tax
level τ. More precisely, it can propose a contract (τ,{I(t)}t≥0) to the South
government, by which the North commits to set the tax level at τ and the
South commits to transfer an amount I(t) at each date t, which we call
internal aid, from the rich resource holders to the poor people. We call the
second and third instruments redistribution instruments, as their role is to
redistribute some ￿nal good to the poor. As with the tax rate, we restrict
the contracted internal aid and the amount of foreign aid proposed by the
North to be constant fractions of the gross revenues of the northern citizens
and the southern rich at each date 15. This implies that F and I are growing
at the same rate as YN and YS.
The South government represents the group of the rich resource holders
(SR), so its objective is to maximize the utility of the representative resource
holder. Thus, in the absence of a contract with the North, the South govern-
ment will not make any redistribution to the poor. We suppose for simplicity
that this government cannot tax the poor group (no redistribution in favor
of the rich people), but this assumption is not crucial to our results. In prin-
ciple, the South government could also impose a tax on the export of the
resource, but it can easily be shown that it would have no interest in doing
that16. So the only decisions taken by the South government are to accept
or to refuse foreign aid and to accept or to refuse the contract proposed by
the North.
To sum up, the game goes as follows. Before date 0, the North government
proposes a contract and an amount of foreign aid to the South government.
The latter accepts or refuses. If the contract is accepted, the North sets
the tax level speci￿ed in the contract from date 0 on. If the contract is
refused, the North freely chooses the tax rate. Next, the general decentralized
equilibrium is realized at each period t ≥ 0. Since there are no information
asymmetries and preferences are time-consistent, the contract proposed at
date 0 is renegotiation-proof.
15This assumption is not restrictive. Allowing F and I to grow at any rate, one can show
that they will be chosen to be constant fractions of the northern and southern revenues.
However, this restriction simpli￿es the computations and the analysis a good deal.
16The reason for that is rather intuitive. When taxing the resource consumed in the
South, the resource producers earn through tax revenues what they would have earned
anyway from selling the resource at a higher price. Moreover, a tax on the resource
would have altered the competitiveness in the South and entailed that a larger part of the
resource would have been used in the North, where it is e￿ectively taxed. See Daubanes
and Grimaud (2007) for a theoretical analysis and refer to the introduction for empirical
support.
8We will solve this game by backward induction. First, we will determine
the equilibrium consumption functions of each representative household, de-
pending on the tax rate and on the transfer levels (section 3). Second, we will
determine the optimal choice of the instruments by the North government in
di￿erent scenarii (section 4).
3 Competitive General Equilibrium
In this section, we solve for the decentralized general equilibrium for a given
tax rate and given amounts of foreign aid and internal aid.
3.1 The Agents Behavior
The Northern and Southern Final Sectors






i − wiLi − pτiRi, i = N,S, (3.1)










where i = N,S.
Remark 1 Note from the equations above that a condition for world e￿-
ciency is τ = 1. Indeed, the equalization of the marginal resource produc-
tivities (left-hand side of equations (3.3)) is a necessary condition for the
maximization of Y = YN + YS and implies τN = τS, i.e. τ = 1.
The Extraction Sector
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The instantaneous budget constraints of the representative northern house-
hold, the representative southern rich people and the representative southern
poor people are respectively:
CN + ˙ BN ≤ wNLN + rBN + HN, (3.6)
CSR + ˙ BSR ≤ pR + rBSR + HSR, (3.7)
CSP + ˙ BSP ≤ wSLS + rBSP + HSP, (3.8)
(3.9)
where Bi is the group i’s net stock of ￿nancial assets and Hi, i = N,SR,SP,
are lump sum transfers to the agents of each group: the northern households
receive the tax revenues and pay for the foreign aid, the southern poor people
receive the aid from the North and the transfer from the southern government
and the resource holders receive the resource rent and pay for the transfers
to the southern poor people:
HN = p(τ − 1)RN − F, (3.10)
HSR = −I, (3.11)
HSP = F + I. (3.12)
The respective program of each representative household is:
max
{Ci}t≥0
Ui, i = N,SR,SP, (3.13)






0 r(s)ds = 0, i = N,SR,SP. (3.14)
The ￿rst-order conditions of these programs lead to the standard Ramsey-
Keynes conditions:
gCN = gCSP = gCSR = gC = r − ρ. (3.15)
3.2 Decentralized Equilibrium Outcome
Since we have not considered the mine to be a ￿nancial asset, the equilibrium
of the ￿nancial market at date 0 writes BN(0) + BSR(0) + BSP(0) = 0. The
10initial debt of one group with respect to the others is arbitrary. For simplicity,
let us assume that no group is indebted initially:
BN(0) = BSR(0) = BSP(0) = 0. (3.16)
In the context of this model, the following proposition presents the de-
centralized equilibrium solution.
Proposition 1 For a given tax rate τ and initial amounts of foreign aid F(0)
and national aid I(0), the equilibrium path is characterized by the following








gRN = gRS = gR = −ρ, (3.18)
gCN = gCSR = gCSP = gC = gF = gI = gY = gYN = gYS



























YN(0) + αYS(0) − I(0), (3.23)
CSP(0) = (1 − α)YS(0) + F(0) + I(0). (3.24)
Proof of proposition 1 See the appendix.
Our study requires to understand the channels through which the north-
ern taxation policy a￿ects the consumption level of each group. Proposition
1 sheds some light on them. First, one can see that the tax rate determines
the geographic split of the production. Namely, equation (3.17) tells us that
the higher the northern tax rate, the lower the northern production relatively
to the southern one. The existence of a world market for the resource im-
plies that the seller price, p, is the same in all countries. Because of the local
tax on the resource, however, the price faced by the ￿rms may di￿er across
countries. This way, the level of the tax a￿ects the respective outputs in the
North and the South. Eventually, equations (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) tell us
that this channel partly determines the consumption levels of all groups since
they depend on the local productions.
11Second, from the later equations, one can see that the tax rate enters
the northern and the southern rich consumption functions directly: the local
outputs being taken as given, the northern tax level in￿uences the respective
consumption levels. Actually, the northern tax rate a￿ects the pro￿ts from
extracting the resource and consequently the northern tax revenues. Those
amounts being shared among the local residents, the northern tax rate de-
termines in this way the two consumptions of northern and southern rich
households.
One can note that the instruments (τ, F and I), such as restricted above,
have no e￿ect on the dynamics of the economy. Technically, this simpli￿es a
good deal the analysis since the problems of choosing the utility-maximizing
instruments can be reduced to static optimization problems.
In the next section, we shall examine how the tax rate on the resource,
the foreign aid and the internal aid will be designed by the North govern-
ment. This study requires to know how these instruments a￿ect the con-
sumption level of each group (N, SR and SP). That is why we de￿ne
consumption levels as functions of these instruments ( τ, F and I). As the
choice of these instruments don’t a￿ect the growth rate of the consump-
tion levels, we can drop their time indexes and denote them by CN(τ,F),
CSR(τ,I) and CSP(τ,F,I)17. Moreover, the utility function of each group
can be denoted respectively by UN(τ,{F(t)}t≥0,{I(t)}t≥0), USR(τ,{I(t)}t≥0)
and USP(τ,{F(t)}t≥0,{I(t)}t≥0)18.
Corollary 1 assesses the net e￿ect of the tax rate on the consumption
levels:
Corollary 1 The northern consumption level is ￿rst increasing and then
decreasing in the tax rate; the consumption levels of the southern poor and
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Proof of corollary 1 See the appendix.
17Note that, from proposition 1, CN does not depend on I and CSR does not depend
on F.
18As CSP is function of the three instrument, so are USP and UN, because of altruism.
As CSR does not depend on F, neither does USR.
12An increase in the northern tax rate on the resource has two e￿ects.
First, it implies that the North captures through tax revenues a larger part
of the resource rent supposed to accrue to the resource producers. This tends
to decrease the consumption level of the resource holders and to increase
that of the northern citizens. Second, it tends to increase the price of the
resource used in the North relatively to the price of the resource used in the
South. This contributes to a loss of competitiveness of the northern ￿rms and
entails a relocation of the production activities to the South 19. This tends
to decrease the consumption levels of the northern households. Accordingly,
the productivity, the wage, and thus the consumption level of the southern
poor people tends to increase.
From the northern viewpoint, increasing the tax rate has a positive (rent
capture) as well as a negative (loss of competitiveness and relocation) e￿ect.
If the tax rate is low (high), the former more (less) than compensates the
latter. From the viewpoint of the resource rich people, a higher tax is always
worse.
The southern poor people bene￿t from an increase in the tax rate essen-
tially because part of the ￿nal production activities of the North consecu-
tively relocates to the South. Although this e￿ect exists theoretically, it may
be irrelevant in the real world. Indeed, in our two-country model northern
￿rms could only relocate to the South, whereas in a setting with more than
two countries, ￿rms could relocate elsewhere. Then, the positive e￿ect of
an increase of the tax rate on the revenue of the poor people is likely to be
marginal.
4 North’s Choice of the Tax under Di￿erent
Redistribution Mechanisms
In this section, we describe the choice of the tax rate by the North and the
determination of the amounts of foreign and internal aid, under di￿erent
possibilities of redistribution.
The North government chooses the optimal instruments (tax rate on the
resource, foreign aid and the contract proposed to the South) taking into
account the future realization of the decentralized equilibrium. In order
to highlight the role of each instrument, we consider three cases. In the
benchmark case, no redistribution instrument is available. The only choice
variable of the North government is the tax rate τ. In the second case, this
19By relocation, we mean that the resource consumption lowers in one country and
increases accordingly in the other, whereas labor is not migrating.
13government may use foreign aid, {F(t)}t≥0, as a redistribution mechanism.
It chooses simultaneously the optimal value of the tax rate and the optimal
level of foreign aid. Finally, in the third case, the possibility of contracting
with the South on (τ,{I(t)}t≥0) is introduced. The North simultaneously
chooses the optimal level of foreign aid and the optimal contract ( i.e. the
utility maximizing tax level and amount of internal aid under the constraint
that the contract has to be accepted by the South government).
Accordingly, the chosen values of the instruments will be denoted with
superscripts NR (no redistribution) in the ￿rst case, A (aid) in the second
case and A,C (aid and contract) in the third case.
4.1 Benchmark: Rent Capture without Redistribution
Suppose ￿rst that the North cannot use either foreign aid or the contract.
Then, it solves:
max
















According to proposition 1, the choice of the tax rate won’t a￿ect the
dynamics of the economy. As a result, the above problem technically reduces
to a static maximization problem. The following proposition describes the
solution chosen by the North government.
Proposition 2 In the absence of any redistribution instrument, the North
government chooses a strictly positive ad valorem tax rate: τNR > 1.
Proof of proposition 2 See the appendix.
The North government chooses strategically the tax rate on the resource
used in its country. Doing so, it trades-o￿ between levying tax revenues and
improving the competitiveness of the northern economy. Proposition 1 tells
us that it is optimal for the North to set a positive tax rate. As a consequence,
a part of the rent supposed to accrue to resource holders is captured by the
North. The strategic choice of the local tax rate in this heterogeneous world
introduces a distortional bias at the global level. Indeed, as noted in remark
1, the only tax rate ensuring world e￿ciency is τ = 1.
14Remark 2 The greater the northern altruism towards the southern poor peo-
ple, the higher the tax rate: ∂τNR
∂δ > 020.
One of the e￿ects of an increase in τ is the relocation of productive ac-
tivities from North to South. In our two-country model, the southern poor
workers bene￿t from this relocation as it increases their productivities and
thus their wages and consumption levels. Since the North cares about the
poor southern workers, it tends to set a tax rate all the higher as it is altru-
istic. As noted in the comment of corollary 1, this underlying e￿ect is likely
to be marginal in a more-than-two-country world.
4.2 Current Situation: Rent Capture and Foreign Aid
When the North is allowed to transfer revenues to the southern poor people
through foreign aid, the North agent solves:
max
τ,{F(t)}t≥0















subject to (3.19)-(3.24) and F(t) ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0.
Note that we do not impose the constraint that the South government
accepts foreign aid. In fact, we shall see in proposition 4 that foreign aid
indirectly bene￿ts the resource holders, so that the South government has no
interest in refusing it.
As in the previous subsection, the problem technically reduces to a static
problem.
In what follows, we are mainly going to focus on the relevant cases where
the North is e￿ectively willing to give some aid. We shall see that a necessary
and su￿cient condition for the North to give a strictly positive amount of






An immediate interpretation of this condition is that the North is su￿ciently
altruistic so that it is willing e￿ectively to give aid to the poor it cares about.
Condition (4.3) also writes δ 1
CSP(τ,0,0)/LS > 1
CN(τ,0)/LN. When the tax rate
is set to a level τ, in the absence of any redistribution, the consumption of
the poor is equal to CSP(τ,0,0) and that of the northern citizens to CN(τ,0).
20See proof of proposition 2.
15From the utility function of the northern people, one can see that the left-
hand side of the latter equation is the instantaneous marginal bene￿t of
giving foreign aid while the right-hand side is the associated instantaneous
marginal cost. Condition (4.3) thus tells that, for a given tax rate, when no
aid is given, the North has a marginal net interest in transferring a positive
amount to the southern poor group.
Another more appealing interpretation of our restriction can be done from
the equivalent condition: δCN(τ,0)/LN > CSP(τ,0,0)/LS. This writing tells
that (4.3) amounts to a restriction to cases where the level of per capita
consumption of the poor does not reach the endogenous poverty line given
by δCN(τ,0)/LN.
The following proposition describes the chosen tax rate and level of foreign
aid.
Proposition 3 If standard foreign aid is possible and if the northern citizens
are su￿ciently altruistic, the North government chooses a strictly positive ad
valorem tax rate and a strictly positive amount of aid. However, the tax rate
is then strictly lower than in the absence of any redistributive instrument.
Formally, if δ > δA(τNR), then 1 < τA < τNR and F A > 0, otherwise,
τA = τNR and F A = 0.
Proof of proposition 3 See the appendix.
We saw in the previous section that beyond the willingness to capture part
of the resource rent, the North has also an incentive to tax high in order to
alter its own competitiveness in favor of the southern workers’ productivity.
This is a sort of sacri￿ce.
Proposition 3 tells us that the North sets a lower tax rate when it uses
foreign aid. Indeed, foreign aid allows the North to increase the consumption
level of the poor without enduring any cost in terms of e￿ciency, because it
is a pure lump sum transfer.
Nevertheless, the North keeps setting a strictly positive tax rate on the
resource. Although the introduction of foreign aid mitigates the incentives to
choose a high tax rate, it does not completely o￿set the North’s propensity
to capture a part of the mining rent through taxation, at the expense of eco-
nomic e￿ciency. This is because the North government does not internalize
all the e￿ects of the tax on the global output. In particular, it does not take
into account its e￿ects on the consumption of the resource holders. As a
result, the original bias in the northern choice of a tax rate, due to strategic
behavior and resource endowments heterogeneity, remains present.
The use of foreign aid results in a lower tax rate and a positive transfer
to the southern poor. Thus, additionally to its positive e￿ect on global
16e￿ciency, it changes the split of the world output among the di￿erent groups.
The following proposition assesses the welfare impacts of the aid instrument.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium allocation, when foreign aid is used by the
strategic North government, Pareto-dominates the allocation when foreign




























τNR,{F(t) = 0}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0

.
Proof of proposition 4 See the appendix.
The welfare of the North is obviously improved when an additional choice
instrument is available. The southern resource holders are better-o￿ since a
lower part of their resource rent is captured by the North (lower tax rate).
The e￿ect of foreign aid on the southern poor is twofold. On the one hand,
they loose competitiveness relatively to the North (lower tax rate). On the
other hand, they are given a pure transfer from the North (strictly positive
foreign aid). Proposition 4 tells that the latter e￿ect more than compensates
the former. Thus, the use of foreign aid by the North government makes
everybody better-o￿.
This subsection illustrates the current interaction between developed re-
source consuming countries and poor resource producing countries: the for-
mer simultaneously extract some mining rent through distortional resource
taxation and transfer aid to the latter.
Next subsection examines the e￿ects of introducing the contract with the
resource holders as a complementary redistribution scheme.
4.3 A Proposal: Contracting on the Tax Level and the
Split of the Rent
Suppose now that, additionally to the aid instrument, the North proposes a
contract (τ,{I(t)}t≥0) to the South government. By this contract, the North
commits to set the tax rate equal to τ in all periods, and the southern rich
commit to make a transfer I(t) in each period t ≥ 0 to the poor. The South
government can refuse the contract, in which case we are back to the problem
of the previous subsection, i.e. the North will implement the tax rate τA and
transfer an amount F A(t) of foreign aid. As the South government represents
the resource holders and no internal aid is given to the poor in the absence of
the contract, a necessary condition for the contract to be accepted is τ < τA.
17So basically, the contract consists of a commitment by the North to lower
the tax rate from τA to τ in exchange of a positive amount of internal aid.





























Here again, the problem reduces to a static problem.
The parallel of condition (4.3) in this subsection is:
δ >
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where CSR(τ,0) − CSR(τA,0) is the additional rent that accrues to the re-
source holders when the tax decreases from τA to τ. The numerator of
δA,C(τ) is thus the per capita consumption level of the southern poor when
all this extra rent is redistributed to them and no foreign aid is given. Then,
similarly to the previous subsection, we will see that δA,C(τ) is the minimum
rate of altruism such that the North is willing to give a positive amount of
foreign aid when the contract with the South stipulates that the tax rate on
the resource will decrease from τA to τ and that all the resulting extra rent of
the resource holders will be redistributed to the poor. Other interpretations
made in subsection 4.2 remain valid here.
The following proposition assesses the choice of the tax rate, of the
amount of foreign aid and that of internal aid by the North government.
Proposition 5 If, beyond standard foreign aid, the North can use the con-
tract de￿ned above, and if it is su￿ciently altruistic, then the North govern-
ment no longer taxes the resource, foreign aid is strictly positive and internal
aid is strictly positive. Formally, if δ > δA,C(1), then τA,C = 1, F A,C > 0
and IA,C > 0.
Proof of proposition 5 See the appendix.
This result is quite interesting. It says that if the North is altruistic
enough, in the presence of the two redistribution instruments, it chooses the
tax rate that maximizes global output, which is τ = 1, as we have seen
in remark 1. This is quite puzzling, given that the North is a strategic
18agent that does not care about the consumption of the rich resource holders.
The intuition for this result is the following. The contract signed with the
South allows to manipulate the split of the world production among the
di￿erent groups. With this new instrument, the North’s objective amounts
to maximizing global production minus a rent that it cannot credibly threaten
to capture from the resource holders, which is their rent in the absence of
the contract. Thus, the optimal tax level is the one that maximizes global
output as well.
Another way of understanding this result is related to the qualitative dif-
ference between the possibilities that the North has to capture the rent of the
resource holders. Without the possibility of contracting, the North tends to
catch a part of the rents of the resource holders and to redistribute part of it
to the southern poor. The two transfers are made through di￿erent channels:
capturing the rents requires the setting of a distortional tax while foreign aid
is a direct lump sum transfer with no consequence on the e￿ciency of the
northern economy. The introduction of the possibility to contract with the
South o￿ers a way to avoid the distortional tax aimed at capturing the re-
source rent. Indeed it renders possible to lower the extent of the distortion
while ensuring that the revenues not captured through taxation are trans-
ferred to the southern poor. Since, we are dealing with cases where the North
is indeed willing to give money to the poor people, the opportunity o￿ered
by the contract is then taken. Contracting then allows to correct the bias in
the northern strategic behavior and restores world e￿ciency.
The introduction of the contract leads to a change in the tax rate and
a change in the amounts of foreign and internal aid. Thus, additionally
to its e￿ciency e￿ects, the contract alters the split of the world output.
The following proposition assesses who wins and who looses from this new
possibility.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium allocation, when both aid and the contract
are used by the strategic North government, Pareto-dominates the one when




























τA,{F A(t)}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0

.
Proof of proposition 6 See the appendix.
The welfare of the North is obviously improved when it has the possi-
bility to use an additional instrument. The southern resource holders have
higher rents due to the lowering of the tax, but all the additional rents are
19redistributed to the poor. Indeed, the participation constraint of the South
is binding (see proof of proposition 5). Thus, the resource holders have the
same payo￿ as without the contract. Finally, the introduction of the contract
has three e￿ects on the consumption of the poor. First, it decreases their
direct revenue because of the decrease in the tax rate. Second, it changes
the amount of foreign aid given by the North. Third, it introduces a posi-
tive amount of internal aid. Proposition 6 tells that the overall e￿ect on the
welfare of the poor is positive.
Propositions 5 and 6 thus show that the introduction of the contract as
an additional redistributive instrument for the North government not only
increases global e￿ciency but is Pareto-improving.
5 Conclusion and Final Remarks
In this paper we set up a North-South exogenous growth model in which
a privileged group in the South owns the entire stock of an essential, non
renewable resource, while the rest of the southern population and the north-
ern population are only endowed with labor. We assumed that the northern
citizens have a higher labor productivity, that they are altruistic towards the
southern workers and that they are represented by a North government. We
also assumed that the South government only represents the interests of the
resource holders.
We allowed the North government to use di￿erent instruments in order to
maximize the welfare of the northern citizens. First, the available instruments
are a tax on the imports of the resource and foreign aid to the poor southern
workers. Second, we introduced a contract with the South government on
the tax level and on the amount of internal rent transfer to be redistributed
from the resource holders to the poor.
We saw that although global output is maximized when there is no tax on
the resource, the North will generally set a positive tax in order to capture
some of the rent supposed to be earned by the resource holders.
We have shown that the simultaneous use of foreign aid and the contract
with the South Pareto-dominates the allocation when only foreign aid is used,
and importantly, it leads to a maximization of the global output (the resource
is no longer taxed by the North). This result is quite interesting. Although
the North government does not directly internalize the e￿ects of the tax on
the revenue of the resource holders, the combination of the two redistributive
instruments (foreign aid and the contract) provides him with incentives to
minimize the extent its distortional actions.
Our results are thus quite optimistic about the scope of the contract with
20the resource holders. To our knowledge, this type of contract does not ex-
ist in the real world and it hasn’t been studied in the economics literature.
But our setting abstracted from some potential problems that could arise in
the real world. First, we supposed that foreign and internal aid could be
collected and redistributed at no cost. Allowing some cost of public funds
would keep the basic intuitions true, but would restrain the cases where for-
eign aid and the contract are worth being used. Second, we supposed that
foreign aid actually reaches the poor and is not diverted by the South gov-
ernment. Unfortunately, we know that a large part of foreign aid does not
reach its destination. This is related to the problem of foreign aid fungibility.
The same is true with internal aid. Our assumptions on the commitment
power of the South are not too restrictive given our dynamic setting if the
North observes the consumption of the poor. Indeed, if the South govern-
ment deviates, the North will no longer wish to transfer foreign aid or to
contract with that government, and the resource holders would be worse-o￿
because the North would set a higher tax on the resource. Thus the possi-
bility of a prolonged cooperation, which is in everybody’s interest given that
it is Pareto-improving, would serve as a commitment device. This is less
obvious if the North doesn’t observe the consumption of the poor. It would
be interesting to check the robustness of our results to the introduction of
information asymmetries.
21A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1 • Let us begin with the proof of equation (3.17).
The production functions (2.1) imply YN/YS = (ANLN/(ASLS))1−α(RN/RS)α,
where, from (2.2), AN/AS = φ−1. Thus, YN/YS = (LN/(φLS))1−α(RN/RS)α.
Besides, equations (3.3) imply RN/RS = YN/(τYS). Substituting the latter
equation in the former, rearranging and simplifying leads to equation (3.17).
• Let us show here equations (3.18) and (3.19). (3.17) implies gYN =
gYS = gY. Since, in (2.7), gF = gI = gYN = gYS, one deduces gY = gC.
Moreover, from (3.15), gY = gC = r − ρ. In addition, by (3.3), gYN = gYS
implies gRN = gRS = gR = gY − gp, which, by (3.5), leads to gR = gY − r.
Besides, from equations (2.1) and (2.2), gY = (1 − α)x + αgR. From
above, this gives gY = (1 − α)x + gY − αr. Rearranging, one obtains gY =
x − αr/(1 − α). Recalling from above gY = r − ρ and using the two later
equations, one gets r = (1 − α)(x + ρ). Substituting this expression of r in
gY = x − αr/(1 − α) and using gCN = gCSR = gCSP = gC = gY = gYN = gYS
leads to (3.19). Using ￿nally gRN = gRS = gR = gY − r leads to (3.18).
• Next, let us show equations (3.20) and (3.21). From (3.18), gR = −ρ.




0 R(0)e−ρt dt = R(0)/ρ. Hence,
R(0) = ρQ0. In addition, equation (3.3) imply RN/RS = YN/(τYS). Us-
ing (3.17), this leads in particular to RN(0)/RS(0) = (LN/(φLS))τ−1/(1−α).
Finally, using the latter ratio and RN(0) + RS(0) = R(0) = ρQ0, one eas-
ily gets: RN(0) = ρQ0/(1 + (φLS/LN))τ1/(1−α) and RS(0) = ρQ0/(1 +
(LN/(φLS))τ−1/(1−α)). Substituting respectively these expressions in equa-
tions (2.1), written at date 0, one obtains equations (3.20) and (3.21).
• Let us eventually turn to the proof of equations (3.22), (3.23) and
(3.24). In budget constraints (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), respectively with equa-
tions (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12), let us substitute as follows. From (3.2),
wNLN = (1 − α)YN and wSLS = (1 − α)YS. From (3.3), p(τ − 1)RN =
α(τ − 1)YN/τ = αYN(τ − 1/τ) and pR = p(RN + RS) = αYN/τ + αYS.
Substituting this way and rearranging, one obtains the following expressions
of the budget constraints. ˙ BN +CN = YN −αYN/τ −F +rBN, ˙ BSR+CSR =
αYN/τ +αYS −I +rBSR and ˙ BSP +CSP = (1−α)YS +F +I +rBSP. Note,
from the above proof of equations (3.18) and (3.19), that r is constant. Solv-
ing those three instantaneous budget constraints as ￿rst-order linear di￿eren-
tial equations respectively is BN, BSR and BSP, one gets three intertemporal





















































−rt dt + BSP(0).
Since, from the transversality conditions (3.14), limT7→+∞ Bi(T)e−rT = 0, i =















































−rt dt + BSP(0).
Let us recall that variables CN, CSR, CSP, YN, YS, F and I increase at the





0 X(0)e(r−ρ)te−rt dt = X(0)
R +∞
0 e−ρt dt = X(0)/ρ. This way, the above
asymptotically integrated budget constraints and assumption (3.16) lead to
equations (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24).
Proof of proposition 2 • Let us ￿rst of all simplify problem (4.1). To do
this, denote the consumption level of groups N and SP at date t ≥ 0 respec-
tively by CN(τ,0)(t) and CSP(τ,0,0)(t). Consider any T ≥ 0. Using equa-
tion (3.19), LN ln(CN(τ,0)(T)/LN) + δLS ln(CSP(τ,0,0)(T)e(t−T)g/LS) =
23LN ln(CN(τ,0)(T)/LN) + δLS ln(CSP(τ,0,0)(T)e(t−T)g/LS)
= LN ln(CN(τ,0)(T)/LN)+δLS ln(CSP(τ,0,0)(T)/LS)+LN(t−T)g+δLS(t−
T)g. Then, the objective of problem (4.1) rewrites:
UN(τ,{F(t) = 0}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0) = LN ln(CN(τ,0)(T)/LN)
R +∞
0 e−ρt dt +
δLS ln(CSP(τ,0,0)(T)/LS)
R +∞





0 e−ρt dt + LNg
R +∞
0 te−ρt dt + δLSg
R +∞
0 te−ρt dt.
So maximizing UN(τ,{F(t) = 0}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0) amounts to maxi-
mizing LN ln(CN(τ,0)(t)/LN)+δLS ln(CSP(τ,0,0)(t)e(t−T)g/LS), at any date
T ≥ 0, where, from (3.19), (3.22) and (3.24), CN(τ,0)(t) = CN(τ,0)(0)egt =
(A0LN)1−α(ρQ0)α(1+(ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−α(1−α/τ)egt and CSP(τ,0,0)(t) =
CSP(τ,0,0)(0)egt = (1−α)(ΦA0LS)1−α(ρQ0)α(1+(LN/(ΦLS))τ−1/(1−α))−αegt.
Since the problem can be solved at any date, let us drop from now the time
argument of the consumption functions.
• The ￿rst-order condition of this problem is: LN(∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ)/CN(τ,0)
+ δLS(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ)/CSP(τ,0,0) = 0. Using the above expressions of
the consumption functions and simplifying, one gets the following equivalent
condition: τ−2(1 + (ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α)) − (ΦLS/LS)(1/(1 − α))τ1/(1−α)−1(1 −






















In this condition, one could show that ZNR(τ) is decreasing in τ,
limτ7→+∞ ZNR(τ) = −(ΦLS/LN)/(1−α) < 0 and ZNR(1) = (1+δLS/LN)/(1−
α). This implies that there exists a unique τ = τNR satisfying the above con-
dition and that τNR > 1.
• Moreover, for a given τ, ZNR(τ) is increasing in δ. It implies that τNR
is increasing in δ.
Proof of proposition 3 • The same way as in the proof of proposition 2,
one can show that problem (4.2) reduces to the static problem of maximizing,
for any T ≥ 0, LN ln(CN(τ,F(T))(T)/LN)+δLS ln(CSP(τ,F(T),0)(T)/LS)
with respect to τ and F(T), under the same constraints. The solution
{F A(t)}t≥0 is then obtained from F A(t) = F A(T)e(t−T)g. Let us then solve
the static problem at any date and drop the time arguments.
• Let us denote by L the Lagrangian of this problem and by π the Lagrange
multiplier associated with constraint F ≥ 0. Then,
L = LN ln(
CN(τ,F)
LN
) + δLS ln(
CSP(τ,F,0)
LS
) + πF, (A.2)
where from (3.19), (3.22) and (3.24), CN(τ,F) = CN(τ,F)(0)egt
= [(A0LN)1−α(ρQ0)α(1 + (ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−α(1 − α/τ) − F]egt and
24CSP(τ,F,0) = CSP(τ,F,0)egt
= [(1 − α)(ΦA0LS)1−α(ρQ0)α(1 + (LN/(ΦLS))τ−1/(1−α))−α + F]egt.
The ￿rst-order conditions of the problem are:
∂L/∂τ = 0, (A.3)
∂L/∂F = 0, (A.4)
πF = 0, (A.5)
π ≥ 0, (A.6)
F ≥ 0, (A.7)
where L is given by (A.2).
• Case ı) π > 0
It implies by (A.5) F = 0. Then, (A.3) writes LN(∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ)/CN(τ,0)+
δLS(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ)/CSP(τ,0,0) = 0, which is the same condition that
gives τNR (see proof of proposition 2). Hence, τA = τNR.
But, from (A.4), π > 0 is equivalent to
δ < (CSP(τNR,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τNR,0)/LN).
• Case ıı) π = 0


















For this solution to be valid, we must have that τ that solves (A.10) satis￿es
(A.9).
Let us ￿rst show that (A.10) has a unique solution. Replacing CN(τ,0)
and CSP(τ,0,0) by their above expressions and simplifying, (A.10) is equiv-
alent to 1 + (ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α) − (1 − α/τ)(ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α)+1/(1 − α) +













25From this condition, one can get that ZA(τ) is continuously decreasing in τ,
limτ7→+∞ ZA(τ) = −∞ and ZA(1) = LN/ΦLS + 1 > 0. This implies that
equation (A.10) has a unique solution, τA > 1.
Now, let us show that case ıı) requires δ ≥ δA(τNR), where δA(τ) is such
as de￿ned in (4.3). By the way, we are going to show that, in this case,
τA < τNR.
Suppose, on the contrary, that δ < δA(τNR). τA is de￿ned by (A.10) such
that (∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ)/(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ) = −1. From the proof of proposition
2, τNR is characterized by
(∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ)/(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ) = −δ(LS/LN)(CN(τNR)/CSP(τNR,0,0)).







where, from the above expressions of the consumption functions, one can ￿nd
(∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ)/(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ) = 1+τ−1/(1−α)LN/(ΦLS)−(τ−α)/(1−α),
which is a decreasing function of τ. Thus, (A.12) implies τA > τNR. CN(τ,0)
is decreasing at τ = τNR and τ = τA. Indeed, (∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ) |τ=τNR=
−(δLS/LN)(CN(τNR,0)/CSP(τNR,0,0))(∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ) |τ=τNR< 0 and
(∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ) |τ=τA= −∂CSP(τ,0)/∂τ |τ=τA< 0. Hence, τA < τNR implies
CN(τA,0,0) < CN(τNR). Considering that CSP(τ,0,0) is increasing in τ,
this also implies:
(CSP(τA,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τA,0)/LN) > (CSP(τNR,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τNR,0)/LN)
> δ. But this in contradiction with (A.9). So we have shown that a necessary
condition for the case ıı) is δ ≥ δA(τNR).
Let us now show that it is also su￿cient, and that it implies τA <
τNR. Suppose that δ > δA(τNR). Using the same reasoning as above,
this implies τA < τNR, which implies (CSP(τA,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τA,0)/LN) <
(CSP(τNR,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τNR,0)/LN) < δ and that τA satis￿es (A.9).
To resume, if δ ≤ (CSP(τNR,0,0)/LS)/(CN(τNR,0)/LN), then case ı)
works, F = 0 and τA = τNR, otherwise case ıı) holds, F > 0 and 1 < τA <
τNR.
Proof of proposition 4 • The proposition
UN
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τNR,{F(t) = 0}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0

is immediate as τA and {F A(t)}t≥0 are the solutions to problem (4.2) and
τNR is the solution to the more constrained problem (4.1).
• From corollary 1, CSR(τ,0) is decreasing in τ. From proposition 3,
τA < τNR. Hence, at all periods, CSR(τA,0) > CSR(τNR,0). Hence,
USR(τA,{I(t) = 0}t≥0) > USR(τNR,{I(t) = 0}t≥0).
26• First, note that, in order to show that USP(τA,{F A(t)}t≥0,{I(t) =
0}t≥0) > USP(τNR,{F(t) = 0}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0), it is su￿cient to show
that CSP(τNR,0,0) < CSR(τA,F A,0) at all periods.
Under assumption δ > δA(τNR), we know, from the above proof of propo-
sition 3, F A = [δLSCN(τA,0) − LSCSP(τA,0,0)]/(LN + δLS). Hence,
CSP(τA,F A,0) = CSP(τA,0,0) + F A = (δLS/(LN + δLS))[CSP(τA,0,0) +
CN(τA,0)]. So we need show CSP(τNR,0) < (δLS/(LN+δLS))[CSP(τA,0,0)+







Let us show now that a su￿cient condition for the later one to hold is
(LN/(δLS))CSP(τNR,0,0) < CN(τNR,0). To do so, we are going to show
that CN(τNR,0) + CSP(τNR,0,0) < CN(τA,0) + CSP(τA,0,0).



























(A.14) and (A.16) imply that −∂CN(τNR,0)/∂τ > ∂CSP(τNR,0,0)/∂τ,
while (A.15) implies −∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ > ∂CSP(τA,0,0)/∂τ. Then, as τ
moves from τNR to τA < τNR, the resulting increase in CN is larger than
the decrease in CSP. Hence, CN(τNR,0) + CSP(τNR,0,0) < CN(τA,0) +
CSP(τA,0,0).
Thus, in order to show (A.13), it is su￿cient to show that CN(τNR,0)+
CSP(τNR,0,0) > CSP(τNR,0,0)+(LN/(δLS))CSP(τNR,0,0), which is equiv-
alent to (LN/(δLS))CSP(τNR,0,0) < CN(τNR,0) and eventually to δ >
δA(τNR).
Proof of proposition 5 • The same way as in the proof of propositions 2
and 3, one can show that problem (4.4) reduces to the static problem of max-
imizing, for any T ≥ 0, LN ln(CN(τ,F(T))(T)/LN) +
δLS ln(CSP(τ,F(T),I(T))(T)/LS) with respect to τ, F(T) and I(t), under
27the same constraints at the exception of the individual rationality constraint
that reduces to CSR(τ,I(T))(T) ≥ CSR(τA,0)(T). The solutions {F A,C(t)}t≥0
and {IA,C(t)}t≥0 are then obtained from F A,C(t) = F A,C(T)e(t−T)g and
IA,C(t) = IA,C(T)e(t−T)g. Let us then solve the static problem at any date
and drop the time arguments.
• Note that the individual rationality constraint,
CSR(τ,I(T))(T) ≥ CSR(τA,0)(T), will be binding at the solution since I en-
ters positively the North’s objective function. Hence, CSR(τ,I) = CSR(τA,0),
which is equivalent to CSR(τ,0) − I = CSR(τA,0) and ￿nally leads to I =
CSR(τ,0)−CSR(τA,0). As, from corollary 1, ∂CSR(τ,0)/∂τ < 0, then I ≥ 0
and τ ≤ τA. The problem of the North government can thus be written
as the maximization of LN ln(CN(τ,F)) + δLS ln(CSP(τ,F,0) + CSR(τ,0) −
CSR(τA,0)) subject to F ≥ 0 and τ ≤ τA. Let us denote by π and χ respec-
tively the co-state variables associated to the former and the latter constraints.
Let us denote by L the Lagrangian of this problem. Then,




where from (3.19)-(3.24), CN(τ,F) = CN(τ,F)(0)egt
= [(A0LN)1−α(ρQ0)α(1+(ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−α(1−α/τ)−F]egt, CSP(τ,F,0) =
CSP(τ,F,0)egt = [(1 − α)(ΦA0LS)1−α(ρQ0)α(1 + (LN/(ΦLS))τ−1/(1−α))−α +
F]egt and CSR(τ,0) = CSR(τ,0)(0)egt
= [(α/τ)(A0LN)1−α(ρQ0)α(1+(ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−α+α(ΦA0LS)1−α(ρQ0)α(1+
(LN/(ΦLS))τ−1/(1−α))−α − I]egt.
The ￿rst-order conditions of the problem are:
∂L/∂τ = 0, (A.18)
∂L/∂F = 0, (A.19)
χ(τ
A − τ) = 0, (A.20)
πF = 0, (A.21)
τ
A ≥ τ, (A.22)
F ≥ 0, (A.23)
π ≥ 0, (A.24)
χ ≥ 0. (A.25)
where L is given by (A.17).
• Case ı) π > 0, χ > 0, τ = τA, F = 0














] = χ > 0.
(A.26)
28For what follows, note that it can be easily shown that ∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ +
∂CSR(τ,0)/∂τ, ∀τ > 0, thus implying that ∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ > 0
Either δ ≤ δA(τNR) and then τA = τNR. Hence, τA is such that
(LN/CN(τNR,0))∂CN(τNR,0)/∂τ+δ(LS/CSP(τNR,0,0))∂CSP(τNR,0,0)/∂τ
= 0 (See proof of propositions 2 and 3). This is in contradiction with (A.26)
because ∂CSR(τA,0)/∂τ < 0.
Either, δ > δA(τNR) and τA < τNR. Then, τA is such that ∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ+
∂CSP(τA,0,0)/∂τ = 0, which is also in contradiction with (A.26) since
∂CSP(τA,0,0)/∂τ > 0 and it has been shown above that ∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ > 0.
This case is not possible.
• Case ıı) π = 0, χ > 0, F > 0, τ = τA
Then, ∂L/∂τ = 0 is equivalent to
∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ + δ(LS/LN)(CN(τA,F)/CSP(τA,F,0))[∂CSP(τA,0,0)/∂τ +
∂CSR(τA,0)/∂τ] = χCN(τA,F)/LN > 0. Just like above, this implies that
∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ > 0, which is in contradiction with ∂CN(τA,0)/∂τ < 0, such
as shown in proofs of propositions 2 and 3.
Cases ı) and ıı) are not possible. Hence, χ = 0 and τA,C < τA, thus
implying IA,C > 0.
• Case ııı) π > 0, χ = 0, τ < τA, F = 0
















and ∂L/∂F = 0 implies π = LN/CN(τ,0) − δLS/[CSP(τ,0,0) + CSR(τ,0) −
CSR(τA,0)]. Hence, π > 0 is equivalent to δ < δA,C(τ), for τ satisfying
equation (A.27).
• Case ıv) π = 0, χ = 0, τ < τA, F > 0




















[δLSCN(τ,0) − LN{CSP(τ,0,0) + CSR(τ,0) − CSR(τ
A,0)}].
(A.29)
Hence, F > 0 is equivalent to δ > δA,C(τ) for τ satisfying (A.28).
Replacing (A.29) in (A.28) gives ∂CN(τ,0)/∂τ + ∂CSP(τ,0,0)/∂τ +
∂CSR(τ,0)/∂τ = 0, which is equivalent to ∂YN/∂τ + ∂YS/∂τ = ∂Y/∂τ = 0.
From (3.17), one gets
29∂YS/∂τ = (ΦLS/LN)(∂YN/∂τ)τα/(1−α)+(ΦLS/LN)YN(α/(1−α))τ(2α−1)/(1−α)
while, from (3.20), one gets ∂YN/∂τ = (−α/(1 − α))(ΦLS/LN)τα/(1−α)(1 −
(ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−1YN. Hence, ∂YN/∂τ + ∂YS/∂τ = 0 is equivalent to
(−α/(1 − α))(ΦLS/LN)τα/(1−α)(1 + (ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−1
− (α/(1 − α))(ΦLS/LN)2τ2α/(1−α)(1 + (ΦLS/LN)τ1/(1−α))−1
+ (α/(1 − α))(ΦLS/LN)τ(2α−1)/(1−α) = 0, which can be easily simpli￿ed to
τ = 1.
Proof of proposition 6 • The proposition
UN(τA,C,{F A,C(t)}t≥0,{IA,C(t)}t≥0) > UN(τA,{F A(t)}t≥0,{IA(t)}t≥0) is im-
mediate as τA,C, {F A,C(t)}t≥0 and {IA,C}t≥0 are the solutions to problem
(4.4) and τA and {F A(t)}t≥0 is the solution to the more constrained problem
(4.2).
• We have proved in the above proof of proposition 5 that the participation
constraint of the southern rich people is binding instantaneously at each date,
so that: USR(τA,C,{IA,C(t)}t≥0) = USR(τA,{I(t) = 0}t≥0).
• Let us now show that
USP(τA,C,{F A,C(t)}t≥0,{IA,C(t)}t≥0) > USP(τA,{F A(t)}t≥0,{I(t) = 0}t≥0).









In the above proof of proposition 5, we have shown that F A,C
= [δLSCN(τA,C,0)−LN(CSP(τA,C,0,0)+CSR(τA,C,0)−CSR(τA,0))]/(LN +
δLS) and IA,C = CSR(τA,C,0)−CSR(τA,0). And we have shown in the proof
of proposition 3 that F A = [δLSCN(τA,0) − LSCSP(τA,0,0)]/(LN + δLS).
Replacing these expressions in (A.30), we have to show that
CSP(τA,C,0,0) + [δLSCN(τA,C,0) − LN(CSP(τA,C,0,0) + CSR(τA,C,0)
− CSR(τA,0)]/(LN + δLS) + CSR(τA,C,0) − CSR(τA,0) > CSP(τA,0,0) +
[δLSCN(τA,0) − LNCSP(τA,0,0)/(LN + δLS)], which is equivalent to
[CSP(τA,C,0,0) + CN(τA,C,0) + CSR(τA,C,0) − CSR(τA,0)]/(LN + δLS) >
[CSP(τA,0,0)+CN(τA,0)]/(LN +δLS). This condition rewrite CN(τA,C,0)+
CSR(τA,C,0) + CSP(τA,C,0,0) > CN(τA,0) + CSR(τA,0) + CSP(τA,0,0).
De￿ning the world output as a function of the tax rate, this condition is
also equivalent to: Y (τA,C) > Y (τA), which is satis￿ed since τA,C maximizes
Y (τ).
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